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Racial Employment Picketing:
Availabiliiy and Extent of Injunctive Relief
I. INTRODUCTION
Picketing of business establishments traditionally has been
associated with efforts of organized labor to unionize employees
and improve working conditions. In recent years, picketing has
been adopted by other groups as a tactic to achieve different
objectives.' Civil rights organizations, for example, have used
picketing to focus public attention on their grievances. 2  The
federal constitution has been held to accord such picketing a
wide measure of protection from state interference.3 Neverthe-
less, courts have enjoined picketing directed at the discriminatory
employment practices of particular business establishments on
many grounds.
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 picketing
of business establishments has been used with increasing fre-
quency as a means to compel compliance with the equal employ-
ment opportunity provisions of the act.5 This increase calls for
a re-examination of the power of federal and state courts to
enjoin racial employment picketing and of the principles gov-
erning the issuance of such injunctions. Consideration must
also be given to the influence the Civil Rights Act may have on
the future development of the law.
II. JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS
Early experience with judicial handling of labor relations
demonstrated the need for restraint in granting injunctive re-
lief in cases arising out of labor disputes.6 Congress reacted by
1. See 1 TELLER, LABOR DISPuTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 134(1940); Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 1284 (1964).
2. See generally KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST A~mNMuNT
123-72 (1965); Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment,
61 Nw. U.L. REv. 177, 183 (1966); Sibley, Direct Action and the Struggle
for Integration, 16 HAsTiNGs L.J. 351 (1965).
3. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
4. 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20OOe-2000e-15 (1964).
5. See HUNTER, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND RACE RELATIONS 247 (1965).
Discussions of the fair employment provisions of the act can be found
in Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 31 BRooKLN L. REV. 62 (1964); Rosen, The Law and Racial Dis-
crimination in Employment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1965); 32 U. CI. L.
REv. 430 (1965); 16 W. RES. L. REV. 608 (1965).
6. See generally FRANKFURTER & GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1930); WIT, THE GOVERNMbENT IN LABOR DIsPuTEs (1932).
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withdrawing from the federal courts jurisdiction to restrain or
enjoin certain concerted activities arising out of a labor dispute.7
Several states followed suit with legislation imposing similar
restraints on state courts.8 Further restrictions on the jurisdic-
tion of state courts resulted from the pre-emptive effect of fed-
eral legislation governing labor-management relations. Because
racial employment picketing is often found to be subject to this
legislation, these jurisdictional limitations should be explored
at the outset.
A. LIITATIONS UPON THE JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS-THE
NOREIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that federal courts shall
not have jurisdiction to issue injunctions in certain cases "in-
volving or growing out of a labor dispute." The definition of
"labor dispute" contained in the act is expressly not limited to
situations involving an employer-employee relationship.'0 The
Supreme Court, in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,"
found that peaceful picketing by nonemployees aimed at com-
pelling nondiscriminatory employment policies constituted a "la-
bor dispute" and held suits involving such activities to be
subject to the anti-injunctive provisions. The public policy de-
clared in the act 12 was found to be equally applicable to asser-
tions of discrimination based on race or color and the more tradi-
tional types of labor disputes involving employment conditions,
wages, and union affiliation."
7. See Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16 MVnqx. L. Rev.
638 (1932).
8. See Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts-Part 1: A
Survey, 50 VA. L. REV. 951 (1964); Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reap-
praised, 10 U.C.L.A.L. R-v. 292 (1963).
9. Norris-LaGuardia Act §§ 1, 4, 5, 7, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 104, 105, 107 (1964). See generally Aaron, Labor Injunctions in
the State Courts-Part 1: A Survey, 50 VA. L. REV. 951 (1964); Aaron,
The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 292 (1963); Note,
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts to Enjoin Labor Disputes, 32 TENN. L. REv.
264 (1965). Congressional authority to limit federal jurisdiction by stat-
ute seems clear. See WaaiHT, FEDERAL CoURTs § 59, -at 208 (1963); Note,
67 HARV. L. REV. 836 (1954).
10. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 13(a) (3), 47 Stat. 73 (1932); as amend-
ed, 29 U.S.C. § 113(a) (3) (1964). -
11. 303 U.S. 552 (1938). See generally 36 McH. L. REv. 1146 (1938);
11 So. CALIF. L. REV. 484 (1938).
12. See Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 47 Stat. "70 (1932), as amended
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
13. See generally Murray, The Right to Equal Opportunity in Em-
ployment, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 388, 392-96 (1945); Rosen, The Law and Ra-
cial Discrimination in Employment, 53 CAL. L. Rv. 729, 764-165 (1965).
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The Court recognized, however, that the act allows the
federal courts to act in suits involving racial employment dis-
putes to enjoin unlawful acts which will result in an irreparable
injury to property where there is no adequate remedy at law
and public officers cannot furnish adequate protection. 4 In
Potomac Eiec. Power Co. v. Washington Chapter of CORE,15
this exception furnished the basis for a federal court injunction
restraining a program to encourage customers of a power
company to place fair employment stamps on punched cards
returned with the payment of their power bills.16
There may be an additional, judicially created exception to
the injunctive prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Some
authorities have indicated that the act does not preclude the
federal courts from enjoining picketing which is motivated by
an unlawful purpose.'7 For example, these authorities would
permit the issuance of an injunction to restrain peaceful picketing
for an employment policy which is unlawful under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.18 However, section 4(e) of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act denies federal court jurisdiction to enjoin the "giv-
ing publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in any
14. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 562
(1938) (dicta). See Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29
U.S.C. § 107 (1964).
15. 210 F. Supp. 418 (D.D.C. 1962).
16. The court expressly did not decide whether the case presented
a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the act since the action was
enjoinable in any event. Nevertheless, the discussion by the court clearly
implies that this was not a labor dispute, and the case has been cited
as standing for that proposition. See Ford v. Boeger, 236 F. Supp. 831,
836-37 (E.D. Mo. 1964).
17. See Hunt v. Crumbach, 325 U.S. 821, 831 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); Order of By. Conductors and Brakemen v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 331 F.2d 368, 369 (5th Cir. 1964) (dicta); Missouri-Illinois R.R.
v. Order of Ry. Conductors and Brakemen, 322 F.2d 793, 798 (8th Cir.
1963) (dicta). See generally, TELLER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 212.
A considerable number of state courts have -held that their baby
Norris-LaGuardia Acts do not prohibit issuing an injunction when the
picketing is for an illegal purpose. E.g., Fair Share Organization, Inc.
v. Mitnick, 134 Ind. App. 675, 188 N.E.2d 609 (1963) (purpose would
violate state fair employment act); see FoRucoscn, A TREATISE ON LABOR
LAw § 216, at 387 (2d ed. 1965); Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 323, 360-70 (1953).
18. Cf. Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Mitnick, supra note 17. In
several cases pickets have made demands that would result in white
employees being discharged. See- Id.; Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md.
421, 178 Atl. 109 (1935); A. S. Beck Shoe Co. v. Johnson, 153 Misc.
363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934). The Civil Rights Act provides
that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge an individual because of his race. 78 Stat.
255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964). See Centennial Laundry Co. v. West
Side Organization, 34 IM. 2d 257, 215 N.E.2d 443 (1966).
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labor dispute" unless such activity involves fraud or violence. 19
It does not seem that the unlawful purpose exception can be
reconciled with this unambiguous and unqualified statutory pro-
hibition.20
A statutory exception to the anti-injunctive provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was created by the Civil Rights Act of
196421 which grants jurisdiction to federal courts to enjoin
racial employment picketing constituting an "unlawful prac-
tice."22 Such picketing is an unlawful practice only if it is an
effort by a "labor organization" to cause an employer to dis-
criminate in violation of the fair employment provisions.23 Sig-
nificantly, a labor organization is apparently defined in such a
manner as to exclude civil rights organizations. 24  Thus, the
Civil Rights Act allows federal courts jurisdiction to enjoin
racial employment picketing only when it is motivated by an
unlawful purpose and done by a labor organization. Unless
both conditions are satisfied the exemption from the provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not applicable and the rationale
of New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. would be con-
trolling.
B. LIMITATIONS UPON THE JunISbIcTIoN OF STATE CouRTs
There are three possible sources of restrictions on the juris-
diction of state courts to enjoin racial employment picketing.
The first is the anti-injunction legislation enacted in several
states. These enactments were motivated by the same concern
for protecting labor activities from indiscriminate interference
by the courts that led to enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia
19. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4(e), 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §
104(e) (1964).
20. Section 4 of the Act has been construed as an absolute prohibi-
tion of injunctions in any case falling within its provisions. Thus, any
activity protected by § 4 may not be enjoined even if § 7 purports to
allow the injunction. See New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,
303 U.S. 552 (1938) (act not concerned with background or nature of
dispute); Railroad Trainmen v. Central of Ga. R.R., 229 F.2d 901 (5th
Cir. 1956); Wilson & Co. v. Berl, 105 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939); Yoerg
Brewing Co. v. Brennan, 59 F. Supp. 625 (D. Minn. 1945); FoRxoscH, op.
cit. supra note 17, § 212; Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 323, 360-70 (1953).
21. Civil Rights Act § 706(h), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(h)
(1964).
22. Civil Rights Act § 706(g), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1964).
23. Civil Rights Act § 703(c) (3), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(c) (3) (1964).
24. See Civil Rights Act § 701(d), 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d)
(1964).
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Act.25 Secondly, there is the possibility that racial employment
disputes may fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board and thus be pre-empted from state
control. Finally, while not a direct jurisdictional limitation, suc-
cessful removal to a federal court may deprive state courts of
power to hear cases of this kind.
1. Little Norris-LaGuardia Acts-
Seventeen states have little Norris-LaGuardia Acts which
prohibit the issuance of injunctions in enumerated cases arising
out of labor disputes.2 6 Since most of these statutes are identical
or nearly identical to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it might be
expected that state courts would follow the reasoning of New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. in extending the defini-
tion of "labor disputes" to include peaceful racial employment
picketing. However, the courts of the only two states which
have ruled on the question are in disagreement.2 7
The Indiana Supreme Court, in Fair Share Organization,
Inc. v. Kroger,28 held that racial employment picketing consti-
tuted a labor dispute under the state's little Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Since the definition of labor dispute in the Indiana statute
was identical to the definition in the federal act,20 the court
25. See articles cited note 9 supra.
26. Conn., Hawaii, Idaho, Ind., La:, Md., Mass., Min., N.J., N.Y.,
N.D., Ore., Pa., Utah, Wash., Wis., Wyo. However, several other states
have legislation restricting to some degree the freedom of a court to
issue labor injunctions. See generally Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the
State Courts-Part I: A Survey, 50 VA. L. REv. 951 (1964).
27. See Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 323, 358-59 (1953). In the earliest ra-
cial employment picketing case, Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178
Atl. 109 (1935), the Supreme Court of Maryland upheld an injunction
against peaceful picketers who were demanding that white employees
be discharged and replaced by Negroes. The court said this was a racial
or social dispute, not a labor dispute. However, Green has little value
as a precedent under the anti-injunction statutes because Maryland's
little Norris-LaGuardia Act was not enacted until several weeks after
the decision. See Mni. LAWS ch. 574, § 76 (1935).
28. 240 Ind. 461, 165 N.E.2d 606 (1960); accord, Fair Share Organ-
ization, Inc. v. Mitnick, 134 Ind. App. 675, 188 N.E.2d 840 (1963). But
see Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Philip Nagdeman & Sons, Inc., 135
Ind. App. 610, 193 N.E.2d 257, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 818 (1963), where
on similar facts the court, in a footnote, doubted that a labor dispute
existed. Id. n.1, at 615, 193 N.E.2d at 260. 'The facts are set forth in
State ex rel.. Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Newton Cir. Ct., 244 Ind.
112, 191 N.E.2d 1 (1963).
29. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-513(b), (c) (1965). Eight other
states define labor dispute in terms identical to the federal act. See
CoNN. Gm_. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-112(b), (c) (1958); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
[Vol. 51:92
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relied on New Negro Alliance in support of its conclusion.
The New York courts are in conflict as to whether racial em-
ployment picketing is a labor dispute under the state's little
Norris-LaGuardia Act. In Anora Amusement Corp. v. Doe,s0 a
New York supreme court held peaceful picketing by the Negro
Youth Association for the purpose of obtaining employment for
its own members was not a labor dispute. The court rejected
New Negro Alliance as inapplicable because, contrary to the fed-
eral act, the New York statute did not encompass associations
with an "indirect" interest in the disagreement.3 1 The court im-
plied that under its statute a labor dispute exists only when the
picketing organization is in the same industry, trade, craft or oc-
cupation as the picketed business.3 2 A similar case, Lifshitz v.
Straughn,3 3 came before an appellate division court two years
later. Without citing Anora Amusement, the court held there
was a labor dispute, relying on New Negro Alliance.3 4 In the lat-
est New York case, Brandenburg v. Metropolitan Package Store
ch. 149, §§ 20C(b), (c) (1964); MiNN. STAT. §§ 185.18(3), (4) (1965);
N.J. STAT. ANx. §§ 2A: 15-58(b), (c) (1952); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-08-01
(1), (2) (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 662.010 (1), (3) (1965); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 206(C), (d) (1964); WASH. REv. CoDE §§ 49.32.110(2), (3)(1962).
30. 171 Misc. 279, 12 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
31. The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor
dispute when the case involves persons . . . in the same
industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or in-
direct interests therein ... or when the case involves ...
a "labor dispute" (as hereinafter defined) of "persons par-
ticipating or interested" therein (as hereinafter defined).
(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person partic-
ipating or interested... if relief is sought against him or it,
and if he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft,
or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct
or indirect interest therein ....
(c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concern-
ing terms or conditions of employment.
Norris-LaGuardia Act § 13 (a), (b), (c), 47 Stat. 73 (1932), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 113 (a), (b), (c) (1964) (Emphasis added.). The italicized
language was not included in the New York, Maryland, and Louisiana
Acts. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:821 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100,
§ 74 (1964); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 807(10).
32. See, e.g., Empire Ralph Corp. v. Moving Picture Operators, 17
Misc. 2d 601, 155 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Silverglate v. Kirkman,
171 Misc. 1051, 12 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Krip Holding Corp. v.
Canavan, 159 Misc. 3, 288 N.Y. Supp. 468 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
33. 261 App. Div. 757, 27 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1941).
34. However, the Lifshitz result may be reconcilable with the rea-
soning of Anora Amusement because the organization in question had
previously organized employees in the same industry. Furthermore, the
organization denied that it sought to represent only Negro employees.
1966]
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Ass'n, 35 a supreme court found that no labor dispute existed when
a Negro group picketed liquor stores to coerce greater purchases
from Negro salesmen. The Brandenburg court cited neither
Anora Amusement nor Lifshitz but relied on a case decided prior
to the enactment of the state's little Norris-LaGuardia Act, A. S.
Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson.3 6
While of doubtful validity under the federal act, the unlaw-
ful purpose exception to the anti-injunction statutes is widely
recognized under state law. 37 In Fair Share Organization, Inc.
v. Mitnick,38 a civil rights organization peacefully picketed busi-
ness establishments demanding that Negroes be employed even
if white employees had to be discharged. Following the prece-
dent of Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Kroger, the court held
that the activities constituted a labor dispute. Nevertheless,
the injunction was held proper since the objective of the demon-
strators would violate Indiana's fair employment legislation.30
It is submitted that the Supreme Court and Indiana courts
have taken the sounder position in holding racial employment
picketing to be a labor dispute.40 Since the purpose of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act is to protect the efforts of employees or prospec-
tive employees to secure acceptable terms of employment, 41 the
act is properly applicable to protect racial employment picketing
from indiscriminate injunctions. This was recognized in New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. by Mr. Justice Roberts
when he stated:
The desire for fair and equitable conditions of employment on
the part of persons of any race, color, or persuasion, and the
removal of discriminations against them by reason of their race
or religious beliefs is quite as important to those concerned as
fairness and equity in terms and conditions of employment can
be to trade or craft unions of any form of labor organization
or association.42
35. 29 Misc. 2d 817, 211 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
36. 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
37. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
38. 134 Ind. App. 675, 188 N.E.2d 841) (1963).
39. The court ignored the question of whether § 4 of Indiana's little
Norris-LaGuardia Act, which is idential to § 4 of the federal act, pre-
cludes such a holding. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-504 (1965).
40. Generally the commentators have supported this result. See,
e.g., TELLER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 136; 23 CORNELL L.Q. 206 (1937).
Contra, 5 U. CHI. L. Rav. 689 (1938).
41. See Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1964) (policy of the act); Norris-LaGuardia Act § 13(c),
47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1964) (disputants
need not be in employer-employee relationship).
42. 303 U.S. 552, 561 (1938).
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The desirability of excepting picketing demanding the im-
plementation of an unlawful employment policy from the anti-
injunction acts is subject to question. It must be conceded that
one of the purposes of the anti-injunction statutes was to curtail
the use of the unlawful purpose doctrine to enjoin peaceful
picketing.43 In addition, one should be reluctant to encourage a
judicial exception to the statutory language lest later decisions
employ the exception to emasculate the statute.44 Yet, it seems
unjust to compel an employer to choose between violating a fair
employment statute or suffering prolonged picketing. Further-
more, most states with little Norris-LaGuardia Acts have long
recognized the unlawful purpose exception in dealing with more
traditional labor disputes.45 Given these considerations, there is
no serious objection to enjoining pickets who are demanding
that the employer engage in unlawful discriminatory hiring
practices.
2. Federal Pre-emption
In general, federal pre-emption in labor law precludes from
state regulation conduct arguably protected by section 7 or pro-
hibited by section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)."a While it seems clear that racial employment picket-
ing would not arguably be an unfair labor practice under section
8,46a it appears that such picketing is arguably protected by sec-
tion 7. Section 7 broadly protects the rights of "employees" to en-
gage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection.4 7 "Em-
ployee" has been interpreted as "not only the existing employees
of an employer but also, in a generic sense, members of the work-
43. See Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 323, 360 (1953).
44. The judicial emasculation of the anti-injunction provisions of
the Clayton Act, the predecessor of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, can be
cited as an example of this danger. See TELLER, op. cit. supra note 1,
§ 194.
45. See Annot., 29 A.L.R. 323, 360-73 (1953).
46. See, e.g., Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Benefi-
cial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Mill-
men's Union v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters, 346
U.S. 485 (1953). See generally Updegraff, Pre-emption, Predictability
and Progress in Labor Law, 17 HASTINGs L.J. 473 (1966).
46a. See Petition of Curtis, 240 F. Supp. 475, 482 (E.D. Mo. 1965);
Curtis v. Tozer, 374 S.W.2d 557, 593-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). The em-
ployer's conduct in refusing to hire Negroes has been held not to be an
unfair labor practice. See Ford v. Boeger, 236 F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Mo.
1964).
47. See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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ing class."43  Thus, it seems arguable that pickets, engaged in
racial employment picketing, seeking to improve employment
opportunities for themselves or Negro members of the employee
class, are encompassed within this broad definition.
The matter would seem to become more complex, however, if
the picketing is for an unlawful purpose, e.g., an employment
policy which discriminates in favor of Negroes. It would make
no difference that the purpose is illegal under state fair employ-
ment legislation, 49 but a different question would be presented
if the purpose is unlawful under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
the latter case, the picketing should not be considered protected
by section 7 of the NLRA.
If this analysis proves correct, most of the present law on
racial employment picketing could be disregarded. Racial em-
ployment picketing would be protected by federal law unless for
a purpose unlawful under federal law. In the latter event, the
picketing could be enjoined by state courts and possibly by fed-
eral courts.50
3. Federal Removal
Because the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits federal courts
from enjoining racial employment picketing, federal removal
may be an effective means of thwarting injunctive relief in
many cases brought in state courts. Although one authority has
indicated that the removal procedure is readily available to avoid
the issuance of an injunction in cases involving racial employ-
ment picketing,5 1 this area of the law is both complex and un-
settled.
The federal removal statute generally allows a defendant to
remove from a state court any civil action over which a federal
district court would have had original jurisdiction.52 Therefore,
a case is removable only if it involves the requisite diversity of
citizenship between the parties or a federal question.53  Sincb
48. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 485
(D.C. Cir. 1951).
49. Cf. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Co., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
50. Because of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, federal courts could not
enjoin the picketing unless the unlawful purpose doctrine were accepted.
See sections IL A and H. B (1) of text, spra.
51. See Work, Injunctive Relief for Economically-Directed Civil
Rights Picketing, 38 COLO. L. REV. 516, 519-20 (1966).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964).
53. See WiuGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 38 (1963). For the purposes of
this discussion it will be assumed the amount in controversy sufficiently
[Vol. 51:92
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the case can be removed only when no defendant is a citizen of
the forum jurisdiction, 4 racial employment picketing cases will
rarely be removable on grounds of diversity of citizenship.
On the other hand, an action to enjoin racial employment
picketing would seem to present a federal question if it is alleged
that the objective of the picketing would violate the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, federal question jurisdiction
could be based on one of the federal civil rights statutes, 5 the
federal right to obey federal law without interference,5 6 or the
standing of certain persons to assert federal rights of a group
they are asked to discriminate against.57  Of course, the well-
advised plaintiff could probably foreclose the possibility of fed-
eral removal by not raising a federal question in his complaint. 8
Even if a federal question or diversity of citizenship is pres-
ent, removal of a suit to enjoin racial employment picketing, not
enjoinable under the Civil Rights Act,59 may be prevented by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. As previously discussed, the anti-
injunction statute provides that federal courts lack jurisdiction
to issue injunctions in certain cases involving labor disputes.
While many courts have construed the statute to deny all juris-
diction over the specified cases, 60 several courts have held that
meets the jurisdictional prerequisite. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964);
1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 104 (1960).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964). Corporations are considered citi-
zens both of the state of incorporation and the principal place of busi-
ness. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
55. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows civil actions to enjoin an
unlawful employment practice, and some racial employment picketing
may constitute an unlawful employment practice. See notes 21-24 supra.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
56. Cf. Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956);
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 191 F. Supp. 871, 875 n.8 (E.D. La.
1961); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 190 F. Supp. 861, 866 n.8 (E.D.
La, 1960).
57. Cf. Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
58. See Cue Pub. Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 233 F. Supp. 443
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Prensa Grafica Cubana S. A. v. Osle, 195 F. Supp. 636
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); J. H. Smith Co. v. Jordan Marsh Co., 161 F. Supp. 659
(D. Mass. 1958).
59. The Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply to suits which are
brought within the narrow provisions of the Civil Rights Act. See notes
21-24 supra.
60. See American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Div., Int'l Union
of Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964); Dixie Mach. Welding
& Metal Works, Inc. v. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 243 F. Supp. 489
(E.D. La. 1965); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Heffernan, 195 F. Supp.
153 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. Hall, 185 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.
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the statute operates only to deny the court power to grant the
injunctive remedy-that jurisdiction means only equity juris-
diction.6 1 If the court lacks equity jurisdiction only, such cases
are removable if all other jurisdictional prerequisites are met.
If, on the other hand, the court lacks complete jurisdiction, there
is no original jurisdiction in a federal court and, therefore, no
possibility of removal.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON THE POWER TO
ENJOIN PICKETING-DEVELOPMENT OF THE
UNLAWFUL PURPOSE DOCTRINE
The foundations of the unlawful purpose doctrine were laid
by the Supreme Court in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. 6 2
Peaceful picketing designed to force a supplier to refuse to deal
with nonunion peddlers was enjoined by a Missouri court on the
ground that the statutory antitrust policy of the state made
such refusals to deal illegal. The Court sustained the injunction.
After upholding the state's power to make such restraints of
trade unlawful, the Court found the objective of the pickets was
to compel the employer to do an unlawful act and that there
was "clear danger, imminent and immediate, that unless re-
strained, appellants would succeed in making [Missouri's anti-
trust] policy a dead letter."63
Subsequent cases amplified and confirmed the unlawful
purpose doctrine. In Hughes v. Superior Court,64 the Court
held that a state may enjoin peaceful picketing designed to com-
pel a violation of judicially adopted policy. International Bhd.
of Teamsters Union v. Hanke65 sustained an injunction against
picketing that the state court believed to be contrary to the best
interests of the community, although no violation of state law
N.Y. 1960); Castle & Cooke Terminals, Ltd. v. Local 137, Int'l Longshore-
men's Union, 110 F. Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953).
There have been several recent discussions of construction of the
jurisdictional language of the act. See Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Col-
lective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1027, 1040-51 (1963); 65 CoLUm. L. REV. 907 (1965); 78 HAv. L. REV. 1665
(1965); 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1096 (1965); 51 VA. L. REV. 974 (1965).
61. See Fitchburg Paper Co. v. MacDonald, 242 F. Supp. 502 (D.
Mass. 1965); Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers Union, 228 F. Supp.
720 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); S. E. Overton Co. v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, 115 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1953); Pocahontas Terminal Corp.
v. Portland Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council, 93 F. Supp. 217 (D. Me. 1950).
62. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
63. Id. at 503.
64. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
65. 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
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or established judicial policy was involved. 66 As finally devel-
oped, the unlawful purpose doctrine leaves "a broad field in
which a State, in enforcing some public policy, whether of its
criminal or its civil law, and whether announced by its legislature
or its courts, could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing
aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy. '67
Whatever limitation upon the injunctive power of the state
courts remains in the unlawful purpose doctrine has been made
less effective by the scope of review adopted by the Court in
examining the findings of lower courts.68 The Court has said
that in cases claiming unconstitutionality of state court decrees,
it will search the record to determine whether there is a reason-
able basis in the evidence for the findings.69 But, in fact, this
reasonable basis test affords very little control over state court
findings of unlawful purpose.70 In Local 10, United Ass'n of
Journeymen Plumbers Union v. Graham,71 the Court sustained a
state court injunction which prohibited picketing for a 100 per
cent union job. This was held to constitute an unlawful purpose
because the state's right-to-work laws prohibited requiring union
membership as a condition of employment. The purpose of the
pickets was inferred from the fact that some union men had
refused to work on the job. In International Bhd. of Teamsters
Union v. Vogt, Inc.,7 2 the Court sustained an injunction barring
pickets with signs reading: "The men on this job are not 100%
affiliated with the A.F.L."7 3 The Court accepted the state court
finding that this picketing was designed to coerce the employer
to interfere with his employees' freedom to refuse union mem-
bership.
66. One commentator has argued that Hanke goes so far as to allow
a state court to enjoin any picketing not in the "community interest."
See Tanenhaus, Picketing-Free Speech: The Growth of the New Law
of Picketing From 1940 to 1952, 38 CoNmxsL L.Q. 1, 41 (1952).
67. International Bhd. of Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284, 293 (1957).
68. See generally Note, Constitutional Protection of Civil Rights
Picketing, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 361, 367-68 (1966).
69. Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers Union v. Gra-
ham, 345 U.S. 192, 197 (1953). See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545,
n.8 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
70. This is the basis of Mr. Justice Douglas' dissents in Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957), and
Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers Union v. Graham, supra
note 69.
71. 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
72. Ibid.
73. Id. at 285.
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If the test is whether a tenuous thread of reasonableness
exists, the requirement of Giboney that there be "clear danger,
imminent and immediate" has been greatly weakened. As ap-
plied in Vogt and Graham, the test requires only that there be
some evidentiary support for the findings made. As Mr. Justice
Douglas said in his Vogt dissent: "Today, the Court signs the
formal surrender of the Giboney doctrine. .... -74
In Cox v. Louisiana,75 the Court upheld a state statute that
prohibited picketing near a courthouse with intent to influence
the outcome of a judicial proceeding. The Court carefully exam-
ined the reasons why a state may make picketing of a courthouse
illegal. It was found that the states are empowered to protect
the integrity of their judicial systems from outside influence by
whatever means are necessary and appropriate. Because the pro-
hibited conduct raised a substantial possibility that the unde-
sired end would result, the statute was upheld. Such a thor-
ough examination of the state action may indicate the beginning
of the return to the unlawful purpose test as laid down in
Giboney.
IV. STATE COURT INJUNCTIONS AGAINST RACIAL
EMPLOYMENT PICKETING
While the Supreme Court struggled with the constitutional
status of picketing, state courts used several rationales to justify
enjoining racial employment picketing. In states with statutory
or judicial policies of nondiscrimination in hiring, the theory
commonly utilized was that the purpose of the pickets was to
compel hiring on the basis of racial considerations.70 In states
without such a policy, courts turned to tort law, finding for the
employer a right to an unhampered market 77 and to freedom in
74. Id. at 295. Mr. Justice Douglas was joined by Mr. Justice Black
and Mr. Chief Justice Warren.
75. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
76. For a survey of state fair employment laws, see generally B.N.A.
STATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAWS (1964); Berg, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLn L. REV. 62 (1965);
Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A
Critical Analysis With Recommendations, 14 BUFrALo L. REV. 22 (1964);
Pollitt, Racial Discrimination in Employment: Proposal for Corrective
Action, 13 BUFFALO L. RE.V. 59 (1963); Rosen, The Law and Racial Dis-
crimination in Employment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1965).
77. E.g., In re Curtis, 240 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Hughes v.
Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948), atf'd, 339 U.S. 460
(1950); Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organization, 34 Inl. 2d 257,
215 N.E.2d 443 (1966); Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Mitnick, 134 Ind.
App. 675, 188 N.E.2d 840 (1963); Brandenburg v. Metropolitan Package
Store Ass'n, 29 Misc. 2d 817, 211 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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hiring whomever he pleases.78  Some courts have found addi-
tional support for their injunctions in the untruthfulness of the
pickets' assertions," in the notion that society would be dam-
aged by a succession of picketing by every minority group,80 and
in the availability of alternative avenues or methods of protest
to redress grievances.81
A. PURPOSE TO COMPEL DiscRIMInATORY HmING
In several states racial employment picketing has been en-
joined on the ground that the purpose of the picketing was to
compel discriminatory hiring in violation of state fair employ-
ment practices legislation or a judicially adopted policy of non-
discrimination in hiring.82 For example, in Hughes v. Superior
Court, 3 the California Supreme Court sustained an injunction
against pickets who were demanding that an employer begin a
program of proportional hiring. The court reasoned that such a
program would discriminate in favor of Negroes in violation of a
judicial policy of fair employment. Following Supreme Court
affirmance of this decision,8 4 several other courts adopted this
rationale. 85
A substantial difficulty presented by the application of this
unlawful purpose test is the determination of the purpose of the
picketing. Generally courts have focused on the language of the
placards carried,8 8 but personal statements of purpose made by
78. NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963), vacated without prejudice, 376 U.S. 190 (1964), 18 U. MmAMI L.
REV. 488 (1964). Cf. Clemmons v. CORE, 201 F. Supp. 737 (D. La.), rev'd
on other grounds, 323 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1964).
79. Young Adults for Progressive Action, Inc. v. B & B Cash Gro-
cery Stores, Inc., 151 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Green v.
Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 Atl. 109 (1935).
80. Hughes v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948), affd,
339 U.S. 460 (1950); Brandenburg v. Metropolitan Package Store Ass'n,
29 Misc. 2d 817, 211 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1961); A. S. Beck Shoe Corp.
v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
81. NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963), vacated, 376 U.S. 190 (1964).
82. See cases cited note 77 supra.
83. 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948), atfd, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
84. Hughes v. Superior Ct., 339 U.S. 460 (1950). "The California
Supreme Court suggested a distinction between picketing to promote
discrimination, as here, and picketing against discrimination: 'It may
be assumed for the purposes of this decision, without deciding, that if
such discrimination exists, picketing to protest it would not be for an
unlawful objective.'" Id. at 466.
85. See cases cited note 77 supra.
86. See, e.g., Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Mitnick, 134 Ind. App.
675, 188 N.E.2d 840 (1963); Brandenburg v. Metropolitan Package Stores
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members of the picketing group have also been found rele-
vant.87 However, the language of the placards and the state-
ments of individuals should not be determinative. Uniformity
of purpose and precise language are not characteristic of pick-
eting.88 A demand that more-Negroes be hired or that a quota
of Negroes be hired-may or may not indicate a purpose to secure
preferential treatment for Negroes. It may merely be a call for
the employer to cease his discriminatory hiring practices.8 9
Thus, in determining the purpose of the picketing, the court
should place primary emphasis on the conclusions that the em-
ployer could reasonably draw from the general tenor of the de-
mands. Moreover, racial employment picketing should be enjoin-
able as motivated by an unlawful purpose only when there is
a substantial possibility that the picketing will cause a violation
of fair employment policies. Unless such possibility exists, fair
employment policies are not materially affected.
Once the purpose of the picketing is determined, its lawful-
ness or unlawfulness under the fair employment policy is
usually clear. If the purpose is to compel the employer to
discharge white employees and replace them with Negroes, the
unlawfulness is apparent. 90 At the other extreme, if the pickets
are seeking to implement the state policy of fair employment,
the purpose should be considered lawful.91 A demand that
Negroes receive preferential treatment in the employer's hiring
practices has consistently been held to constitute an unlawful
purpose.92 The results in these situations seem to follow di-
Ass'n, 29 Misc. 2d 817, 211 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1961); A. S. Beck Shoe
Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
87. See Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Mitnick, supra note 86.
88. See, e.g., Cafeteria Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
89. See the dissent of Chief Justice (then Justice) Traynor in
Hughes v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 850, 858, 198 P.2d 885, 895 (1948),
aj'd, 339 U.S. 460 (1950>.
90. See, e.g., Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Mitnick, 134 Ind. App.
675, 188 N.E.2d 840 (1963); A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. V. Johnson, 153 Misc.
363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
91. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.'ir. CORE, 241 Cal. App. 2d
498, 50 Cal. Rptr. 638 (Ct. App. 1966); Centennial Laundry Co. v. West
Side Organization, 55 Ill. App. 2d 406, 204 N.E.2d 589, aff'd, 34 Ill. 2d 257,
215 N.E.2d 443 (1966).
92. See, e.g., Ford v. Boeger, 236 F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Mo. 1964);
Hughes v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948), ajfd, 339
U.S. 460 (1950); Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Philip Nagdeman &
Sons, Inc., 135 Ind. App. 610, 193 N.E.2d 257 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
818 (1964), facts set out in State ex rel. Fair Share Organization, Inc.
v. Newton Cir. Ct., 244 Ind. 112, 191 N.E.2d 1 (1963); cases cited note 77
supra. No fair employment legislation was involved in New Negro
Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
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rectly from the language of fair employment legislation and
the policies embodied therein.9 3 None can be criticized as a
matter of statutory construction.
B. TORT-BASED THEoI ms
In states with no legislative or judicial policy of nondis-
crimination, the courts have applied tort concepts to racial em-
ployment picketing cases. 4 Unless privileged, picketing which
interferes with the plaintiff's economic expectations is tortious
and may be restrained by injunction. 5 Privilege is established
by a showing that defendant's conduct will protect or promote
an interest superior to that allegedly injured.96
In A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson97 and Green v. Sam-
uelson,95 picketing designed to secure the employment of a cer-
tain percentage of Negroes, even if whites had to be discharged,
was held enjoinable. The courts found the purpose of the
picketing was insufficient to justify direct interference with
the employer's business. However, in Anora Amusement Corp.
v. Doe,99 a purpose to obtain more employment for Negroes' 00
was held to justify the harm which could be caused others.
Each of these cases appears to have adopted a reasonable
balance between the interests of the pickets and the employer.
A just result can be reached only if the potential benefit of the
picketing is weighed against the extent of the harm which may
result to the employer and society. Certainly, the social value of
picketing clearly designed to promote discrimination in favor of
Negroes is less than that which seeks to end all discriminatory
hiring practices.10 It is not unreasonable to conclude that the
93. See Note, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 608, 613-16 (1964).
94. See NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963), vacated, 376 -U.S. 190 (1964); Young Adults for Progressive
Action, Inc. v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc., 151 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1963); Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 Atl. 109 (1935);
Anora Amusement Corp. v. Doe, 171 Misc. 279, 12 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct.
1939); A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp.
946 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
95. See 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §9 6.11 at 513, 6.12 at 514, 6.13 at
523 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS §§ 123, 124 (3d ed. 1964).
96. Ibid.
97. 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. -1934).
98. 168 Md. 421, 178 Atl. 109 (1935).
99. 171 Misc. 279, 12 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
100. It is not clear from the opinion whether the pickets were de-
manding an end to discriminatory hiring practices or discrimination in
favor of Negroes. See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text.
101. See 35 COLuM. L. REv. 121-23 (1935); 48 HARv. L. REv. 691-92
(1935); 66 YALE L.J. 397 (1957). Contra, 83 U. PA. L. Rnv. 383-85 (1934).
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former activity is enjoinable, while the latter activity is not.10 2
Even though Johnson, Green and Anora Amusement all were
decided prior to the establishment of the unlawful purpose test
as a constitutional limitation upon court injunctive power, nei-
ther their result nor their reasoning appears to have been invali-
dated by the subsequent constitutional development.
- A recent Florida decision, NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc.,10 3
is more difficult to justify, both jurisprudentially and as a matter
of social policy.10 4 In that case, the propriety of injunctive
relief was determined by balancing the employer's interest in
commercial expectations against the pickets' interest "in their
social objectives." The court found the pickets' interest out-
weighed by the injury to the employer's business and held the
picketing to be an unlawful interference. From the opinion it
appears that the NAACP's purpose may have been no more than
to compel the plaintiff to pursue nondiscriminatory employment
policies. The court gave no serious consideration to the ultimate
purpose of the picketing and the applicability of the privilege
doctrine.10 5 In addition, the court's undue emphasis on the
employer's economic interests would seem to allow all but the
most ineffective racial employment picketing to be enjoined.
As a- matter of tort law, picketing for nondiscriminatory
employment practices should be held privileged. 06 Further-
more, present constitutional limitations upon state court power to
* 102. Ibid.
103. 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), vacated, 376 U.S. 190
(1964); accord, Young Adults for Progressive Action, Inc. v. B & B Cash
Grocery Stores, Inc., 151 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). The cases
are discussed in Note, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 453 (1964).
104. An extensive criticism of the court's reasoning may be found
in 18 U. MIAm L. Ray. 488 (1964).
. 105. The Florida court may have been under the impression that the
privilege doctrine applies only to labor disputes. See Green v. Samuel-
son, 168 Md. 421, 178 Atl. 109 (1935); A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson,
153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Such an assumption
clearly seems inac6urate.- See Hughes v. Superior Ct., 186 P.2d 756 (Cal.
Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948),
aff'd, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), and cases discussed .therein. See generally
PROSSER, TORTS §§ 123; 124 (3d ed. 1964).
106. See Hughes v. Superior Ct., supra note 105; Anora AmuSement
Corp. v. Doe, 171 Misc. 279, 12 N.Y.S.2d 400 '(Sup. Ct.'1939); 1 TELLEA; LA-
BOR DIsPuTEs AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINInG § 136, at 427-28 (1940); RE-
STATEMET, TonTs §'767(d), comment e (1932); cf. FoaxoscH, A TRrATisE
ON LABOR LAW § 194 (2d ed. 1955). See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.
v. CORE, 241 Cal. App. 2d 498, 50 Cal. Rptr. 638 (Ct. App. 1966); Cen-
tennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organization, 34 Ill. 2d 257, 215 N.E.2d
443 (1966), where the pickets were allowed to proceed since their goal
would not violate the state fair employment policy.
[Vol. 51:92
RACIAL PICKETING *
enjoin picketing probably demands such a result. 10 7 Recent
Supreme Court decisions have indicated that an injunction may
issue against peaceful picketing only when a serious state
interest is endangered; L 8 thus, a state may no longer be free to
define unlawful purpose so broadly as to prohibit all picketing
it finds distasteful. 10 9
C. SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS
It is generally established that false and misleading asser-
tions by pickets may be enjoined." 0 However, the Supreme
Court has recognized that preciseness of language has never been
one of the virtues of placards, and has held that picketing
cannot be prohibited merely because the language used is am-
biguous and capable of being construed as untrue."' Thus,
"unfair" and "fascist" have been labelled "loose'language or un-
defined slogans that are part of the give-and-take in economic
and political controversies.""12
State courts have not demonstrated the same restraint.
For example, one court deemed a sign saying "This Store Dis-
criminates Against Negroes" to be untruthful because it was not
shown that a Negro had ever been refused a job because of his
race. 1 3 A sign saying "Help Us Fight Communism" was deemed
untruthful because there was no evidence that the employer or
any member of his family was a° member of the Communist
Party. ' 4 It would require'a fine line' to' distinguish "discrimi-
nates" and "communism" from "unfair" and "fascist." The test
applied by this court apparently would permit no more than a
sign saying "This store did not hire X, who is a Negro." Such
precision cannot be demanded if pickets are to be afforded any
protection in presenting generalized grievances and appealing to
107. See 66 YALE L.J. 397, 410 (1957).
108 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina,*372 U.S. 229 (1963).
109. Ibid. See Mr. Justice Black*s concurring and dissenting opinion
in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 580-81 (1965).
110. See, e.g., Fair Share Organizatibn, Inc. v. Mitnick, 134 Ind. App.
675, 188 N.E.2d 840 (1963). Cf. West Willow Corp. v. Taylor, 23 Misc.
2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct.); appeal dismisse d, 10 App. Div. 2d
1002, 205 N.Y.S.2d 810 '(1960) Individual' Retail* Food Store Owners
Ass'n v. Penn Treaty Food Stores Ass'n, 33 'Pa. D & C 100 (C.P. 1938);
McMorris v. Hudson Sales Corp., 233 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950):-
111. Cafeteria Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
112. Id. at 295. " -
113. State ex rel. Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Newton Cir. Ct.,
244 Ind. 112, 191 N.E.2d 1 (1963).
114. Ibid.
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sympathy.
. Some courts have expressed a fear that if Negroes are per-
mitted to engage in racial employment picketing, employers will
be subjected to demands by' every minority group." 5 They
argue that such activity should be enjoined before it divides
society. However, this argument does not satisfy the constitu-
tional unlawful purpose limitation, and ignores the realities of
the position of minority groups in America today. So that per-
sons discriminated against may achieve integration into the fabric
of society, avenues of change must remain open."8
One court has suggested that, because other means of achiev-
ing the economic and -social goals of minority groups are avail-
able, picketing may be enjoined."17 Such other means may be
other self-help schemes deemed less disruptive or injurious. In
many states legislation has provided legal or administrative rem-
edies to resolve disputes arising out of alleged discrimination in
employment. 18 Finally, federal civil rights legislation has
created a procedure ultimately available in most cases of this
kind. 1 9 However, notwithstanding the adequacy of other ave-
nues of redress, the argument must fail. Certainly the consti-
tutional unlawful purpose requirement does not permit a state
to make all picketing illegal simply because other means are
available. Furthermore, there is no indication that either state
or federal civil rights legislation was intended to pre-empt
self-help attempts to redress discriminatory practices pro-
hibited by its provisions.
As a matter of good social policy, whichever theory is ap-
plied the courts should only enjoin racial employment picketing
in the clearest cases. The average Negro worker, less educated
and less skilled than his white counterpart, is simply unable to
compete for employment on a completely equal basis.12 0 There-
115.- See Hughes v.'Superior Ct.,'339 U.S. 460, 464 (1950); Branden-
burg v Metropolitan Package Stores Ass'n, 29 Misc. 2d 817, 211 N.Y.S.2d
621: (Sup. Ct. 1961); A.,S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 636,
274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct, 1936).
* 116. See, e.g., KALVEN, THE NEGRo AND THE FRST AMENDMENT (1965);
LERNER, AmERICA AS A CIVILZATION, 85-94, 501-524 (1957) ; MYRDAL, AMER-
IcAN DILEMMA (1944); Note, The Ccmmon-Law and Constitutional
Status of Anti-Discrimination Boycotts, 66 YALE L.J. 397, 410 (1957).
117. See Chancellor's Decree reported in NAACP v. Webb's City,
Inc., 152.So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), vacated, 376 U.S. 190
(1964).
118. See note 29 supra.
119. See Civil Rights Act: §§ 705-06, 78 Stat. 258-59, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-4-5 (1964).
120. See generally Edwards, Changes in Occupation as They Affect
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fore, to alleviate the highly disproportionate degree of unem-
ployment 12 1 and the resulting social unrest among Negroes,'
122
it has become necessary for government to encourage industry
to find ways to employ more Negroes. 1 23 Surely private groups
should not be unnecessarily limited in their attempts to attain
the same goals by picketing.
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 may exert some influence on
the availability of injunctive relief against racial employment
picketing in the state courts. In those states which have devel-
oped an unlawful purpose test from local fair employment
policies, the substantive standards will probably remain un-
changed since definitions of unlawfulness drawn from the state
the Negro, in ASSURING FR DOM TO =s FREE 127-31 (Rose ed. 1964);
Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions:
A Critical Analysis With Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L. REv. 22-32
(1964); Pollitt, Racial Discrimination in Employment: Proposals for
Corrective Action, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 59 (1963).
121. Representative Adam Clayton Powell, citing figures from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, has reported that:
In June of 1965 the unemployment among white people in the
United States was 4.1 per cent; the unemployment among black
people in the United States was 8.3 per cent.
One year later, in June of 1966, the unemployment of whites
had shrunk from 4.1 to 3.5 per cent. -But the unemployment of
blacks increased from 8.3 to 9 per cent.
A Negro Congressman Talks About "Black Power", U.S. News & World
Report, Aug. 15, 1966, pp. 38, 41.
122. "Discrimination in employment . .. has been the predominant
target [of mass protests] from the outset. It has been a major motivating
factor, even when the declared objective of the demonstrations has been
the removal of racial barriers in other areas." NORGREN & HILL, TowARD
FAIR EMPLOYMENT 4 (1964); see Moynihan, Behind Los Angeles: Jobless
Negroes & The Boom, The Reporter, Sept. 9, 1965, p. 31.
123. The Minneapolis Morning Tribune, Aug. 4, 1966, p. 1A, reported
that "Gov. Karl F. Rolvaag and Minneapolis Mayor Arthur Naftalin
[after a conference with business leaders] promised 60 jobs for Negroes
Wednesday ... to avert further violence on the city's North Side."
See New Drive to "Fulfill These Rights", Business Week, May 28, 1966,
p. 38.
Businessmen who cooperate with these programs by engaging in
practices which result in a high number of Negro applicants for employ-
ment should not be held to be violating the Civil Rights Act. For ex-
ample, an industry could make it clear that Negroes are welcome, ad-
vertise in Negro news media, and submit employment requirements to
organizations concerned with securing employment for Negroes. But see
Civil Rights Act § 704(b), 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-3(b) (1964).
In fact, given the present social circumstances, the courts should be re-
luctant to hold that even overt discrimination in favor of Negroes violates
the act when done in response to the urging of public officials.
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and federal legislation usually will be identical.124  However,
the federal act would appear to create an additional cause of
action in these states. In addition to his claim arising under
state law, an employer faced with demands that he discriminate
in favor of Negroes could also state a claim under federal law
by alleging that the purpose of the pickets was made unlawful
by the Civil Rights Act. Because any case in which this federal
claim is asserted may be removable to a federal court having no
power to grant injunctive relief,125 this newly created federal
right may be useless to a picketed employer and may constitute
no more than a procedural trap.
1 26
States which have enjoined racial employment picketing on
tort principles could accommodate the federal legislation in var-
ious ways. Tort rationales could be abandoned in favor of an
unlawful purpose test allowing injunctions directed against
peaceful racial picketing only when the purpose of the pickets
is contrary to the federal act. Under. this theory, the employer
could state a claim only by raising issues of federal law. How-
ever, due to the removal possibility such a theory could effec-
tively eliminate the state remedy.
The same test could be adopted, without raising substantial
procedural difficulties, by finding in the civil rights legislation
an expression of national policy so compelling that it ought to
be judicially recognized as the policy of the state. Under this
theory, an employer would state a claim by alleging that the
purpose of the picketing violated the judicially adopted fair em-
ployment policy as embodied in the federal act. While such a
'doctrine would probably create a new jurisdictional basis for Su-
124. For example, in Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organi-
zation, 34 Ill. 2d 257, 215 N.E.2d 443 (1966), picketing for the purpose of
'ending discriminatory hiring practices was said to be lawful, while
picketing, demanding quota hiring was said to be for an unlawful purpose
since such an employment practice would violate both the federal and
state civil rights legislation. There is some legislative history to sub-
stantiate this view. See Berg, Equal Opportunity Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 31 BROoxLYN L. REv. 62, 77 (1964); see also Hughes v. Su-
perior Ct., 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
125. See note 60- supra.
126. It is clear that a plaintiff may avoid this trap by stating only
the claim arising under local law. Peterson v. Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Firemen & Enginemen, 272 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1959); J. H. Smith Co.
v. Jordan Marsh Co, 161 F. Supp. 659 (D. Mass. 1958). However, if
a federal claim is to be asserted, removal may not be avoided by drafting
the complaint without reference to applicable law. Produce Terminal
Realty Corp. v. New York, NH. & H.R.R., 116 F. Supp. 451 (D. Mass.
1953).
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preme Court review of the state decision,'2 7 there is no sugges-
tion in the decided cases that such a cause of action will support
federal question jurisdiction.
The Civil Rights Act will probably have the greatest im-
pact on states that continue to employ tort concepts. Tradi-
tionally, these states have determined the propriety of injunc-
tive relief by balancing the goals of the picketing against the
rights of the employer to an unhampered market and to the pur-
suit of any employment policy he desired.12  Invariably, the
courts found the balance in the businessman's favor.129  The
Civil Rights Act, however, has altered the interests-to be weighed
on each side of the balance. The employer is no longer free
to follow an employment policy based on racial discrimination. 30
In addition, pickets demanding an end to discriminatory em-
ployment practices are supported by a strong federal policy.
13
'
The scales now seem clearly tipped in favor of allowing the
picketing.
VI. THE SCOPE OF THE INJUNCTION
Since the state has power to enjoin peaceful picketing only
when it is protecting some substantial state interest, 132 it would
seem to follow that unless the lawful cannot be separated from
the unlawful' 3 ' the injunction can be directed constitutionally
only against those aspects of the picketing that present a threat
to the state interest. Beyond enjoining that conduct the injunc-
tion infringes on the freedom of speech of the pickets.
Thus, in Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organiza-
tion"34 a blanket injunction prohibiting all picketing or distribu-
tion of handbills near the plaintiff's company was found to be
erroneous. "Activities of defendants which are not unlawful of
127. See note 94 supra.
128. See Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
129. See notes 94-100 supra and accompanying text.
130. See note 16 supra.
131. See 17 FLA. L. REV. 453, 457 (1964). One court has suggested that
the Civil Rights Act actively sponsors peaceful protests against discrim-
ination in employment. Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organiza-
tion, 34 Ill. 2d 257, -, 215 N.E.2d 443, 447 (1966).
132. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
133. The court would not have to go to extraordinary lengths to
separate the lawful from the unlawful. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union
.v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941). But cf., Cafeteria
Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
134. 55 Ill. App. 2d 406, 204 N.E.2d 589 (1965), affd, 34 Ill. 2d 257,
215 N.E.2d 443 (1966).
1966J
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
themselves or undertaken for unlawful purposes or which do not
lead to violence cannot be enjoined. '135 Other courts have not
so limited their orders. In NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., the
injunction forbade "displaying signs, posters or handbills request-
ing that members of the public not trade with the plaintiff"
and prohibited "picketing the premises of plaintiff .... "136
The Young Adults injunction prohibited "maintaining in any
manner picket lines at or near plaintiff's business."' 37 These
injunctions are consistent with the underlying tort rationale-
freedom to employ without regard to race and a right to be
free from interference in one's commercial expectations-but
cannot be constitutionally justified.
An equity court has the power to fashion a decree so as to
eliminate the unlawful aspects of the picketing while per-
mitting those aspects that are lawful. This power was utilized
by many courts in the area of labor relations prior to the Norris-
LaGuardia Act'3" and should be applied in cases involving racial
employment picketing. It would allow the state to protect its
interests and yet would allow the pickets to advance their legiti-
mate economic and social ends.
135. Id. at 416, 204 N.E.2d at 594.
136. 152 So.2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), vacated, 376 U.S. 190
(1964).
137. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc. v. Young Adults for Progressive
Action, Inc., 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 192, 193 (1962), affd, 151 So. 2d 877
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
138. See, e.g., Great No. Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414 (D.N.D. 1923).
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